

Abstracts

Nature of Primary and Essential Predication and Common Technical Predication; A Glance at their definitions, implications and application in intellectual sciences

Ahmad Aboturabi

The division of propositions into primary and essential predication and common technical predication is a useful initiative made by Muslim logicians. These propositions have their own aspects and dimensions on which no serious reflection has thus far been made. The present article deals with the following issues: historical background of primary and essential predication and common technical predication, existing disagreements on their definitions and characteristics, possibility of generalizing this division to include hypothetical propositions, possibility of generalizing this division to include non-self-evident propositions and negative and false propositions, justifying the truth of primary and essential predication on the basis of the fact that it is an example of 'predicating something of itself', the way a primary and essential predication is indicative of the reality in that these kinds of propositions are meant to predicate one concept on another having no relation with existential unity between subject and predicate terms and the relation between these kind of propositions with analytic and synthetic propositions. One of the findings of this article is that the current definition of these propositions put forth by Muslim logicians is unable to serve the purposes and successfully resolve the doubts raised in this regard. To overcome the difficulty, one must accept the definition presented by contemporary logicians, which does not suffer from these kind of problems.

Keywords: primary and essential predication, common technical predication, analytic, synthetic, self-evident, predicating something of its own self, factual.

A New Method of Formal Deduction with the Application of Minimum Number of rules

Askari Sulaimani Amiri

All rules of deduction are separately introduced and their conditions are stated in direct and syllogistic arguments in classical logic. All deductions are made on the basis of these rules. In order to explain the accuracy of the conclusions of these rules, logicians sometimes reduce the rules of some to those of the others. According to the method suggested by this article, there are only two rules of refuting the predicate and simple conversion that are introduced in direct arguments. Other deductive rules such as 'conversion by contradiction', 'refutation of the subject', 'perfect refutation' and 'converse refutation' are deduced from these two rules without being introduced. Similarly, the article explains the nature of 'simple conversion' through the genealogy of 'categorical propositions' and the method of artificial quantification of predicates. Similarly,

it suffices to introducing syllogism and the role of the middle term in it in categorical syllogisms. Through this method, one can reach to the conclusions of all figures of the syllogism without introducing them or reducing the second, the characterized as third and the forth figures of syllogism to the first figure of syllogism. Moreover, this method is a simple one, always used in the same manner, needing no various conditions .

Keywords: direct argument, simple conversion, refutation of the predicate, contraposition, perfect refutation, refutation of the subject, converse refutation, categorical syllogism, four figures of syllogism.

An Explanation for the Veracity of First Principles

Abbas Arifi

First principles are one of the sources of knowledge. All theoretical sciences are based on these first principles. The term ‘first principles’ includes any propositions whose truth can be readily ascertained after being merely thought over. They include a range of propositions from the so-called Kantian analytic propositions to the principle of contradiction, etc. This article intends to explain why the first principles are true. It touches two explanations presented on the basis of two theories. One explanation is based on a classical theory (a semantic theory) that is the major theory of Muslim philosophers. Another theory is based on a modern theory (theory of reference to knowledge by presence) that is put forth by Ayatollah Misbah. This latter theory can be traced back in ‘Allama Tabatabaei’s theory of knowledge. The article also deals with similarities and differences of these two theories, explicating these theories at some points and criticizing them at others.

Keywords: first principles, first propositions, truth of first principles, veracity of first principles, classical theory, modern theory, conceptual characteristics of first principles, meaning structure of first principles, reference to knowledge by presence.

Disambiguation of True, External Indefinite and Negative Propositions

Asadullah Fallahi

Authors of classical formal logic, from Aristotle to Muzaffar, have worked out many logical terms which can be said to have undergone many conceptual changes. Unfortunately many contemporary Iranian philosophers and logicians, who are still interested in classical logic, use these logical terminologies with extreme ambiguities. In fact, many of the current usages are marked by equivocations. These ambiguities and equivocations result in serious differences in opinion, which are in one way or the other, expressed themselves in articles, books, theses, etc. According to the author, as long as the classical logic does

not apply natural language, one cannot remove these ambiguities and the disagreements they cause. The artificial language of modern logic and the deep analysis made in this logic can contribute a great deal to clearing up these ambiguities and solving the problems of classical logic and even Islamic philosophy. One of the increasingly important and controversial problems in classical logic and Islamic philosophy is the discussion of dividing a proposition into *haqiqiyah* (true), *kharijiyah* (external) and *zihniyah* (mental). Referring to various definitions of these two kinds of propositions (available in the works of early logicians) and the existing disagreements about them (the works of past and contemporary scholars), the article seeks to analyze these definitions formally on the basis of modern logic in order to show their weaknesses and strengths. On the basis of these formal analyses, one can easily root out many of these differences of opinion. As for more difficult cases, the author has dealt with solving existing disagreements.

Keywords: old logic, modern logic, model logic, existence predicate, proposition true (*haqiqiyah*) proposition, external (*kharijiyah*) proposition, *ma'dul al-mahmool* (propositions with their predicates in the negative form) and *saliba al-mahmool* (propositions with negative predicates).

Place of *Aqd al-waz'* in Logic

Muhammad Reza Muhammad Alizadeh

The correct use of quantified propositions in rules and arguments depends on the exact understanding of these propositions. Since quantified propositions include confirmation of the subject (*aqd al-waz'*) and confirmation of the predicate (*aqd al-haml*), therefore a thorough understanding of these propositions requires a thorough understanding of *aqd al-waz'* and *aqd al-haml*. There are two different views in regard with *aqd al-waz'* – one focuses on modality in *aqd al-waz'* and the other on whether it is a perfect or imperfect construction.

In regard with the first question, there is no controversy among logicians in terms of maximum number of conditions necessary in *aqd al-waz'* and *aqd al-haml* for whatever of modalities are true of *aqd al-haml* can be true of *aqd al-waz'*. However, there is a difference of opinion among logicians in respect with minimum number of conditions necessary in *aqd al-waz'* and *aqd al-haml*. Though most of the logicians are of the view that 'actuality' is necessary in *aqd al-waz'*, some assume that 'possibility' is enough. As to the second question, most of the logicians hold that *aqd al-waz'* is an imperfect construction. However, there are some logicians who believe that *aqd al-waz'* is a perfect construction.

The author studies different views put forth by logicians in regard with *aqd al-waz'* from these two perspectives.

Keywords: *aqd al-waz'*, actuality, possibility, *Faribi*, Avicenna, Qutb Razi,

Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra .

A Review of Suhrawardi's Logical Criticisms and Innovations in Illuminist Philosophy (*Hikmat al-Ishraq*)

Muhammad Baqir Malikiyan

It is commonly believed that Sheikh Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi has criticized Aristotelian logic bringing about some logical innovations. For example, he refuted the Peripatetic rule of definition through presenting certain counter-examples, making it the subject of many criticisms. Likewise, he reduces all modal propositions to necessary propositions and all the negative quantified propositions to positive propositions. He proved that there is no difference between definite negative propositions (in which negative sign is not part of the predicate) and indefinite positive propositions (with their predicates in the negative form). He also reduced all modes of syllogistic deductions to the first mode of the first figure of Aristotelian syllogism. He also entertained his own point of view concerning intuitive propositions.

Referring to the logical section of Illuminist philosophy (*Hikmat al-Ishraq*), the author tries to review these innovations so that it becomes clear whether or not these innovations are new and original.

Keywords: definition, modal proposition, necessary proposition, negative proposition, indefinite (*ma'dula*) proposition, mode, figure, intuitive propositions, confirmation of the subject (*aqd al-waz'a*).

A Glance at Another Definition of External (*Kharijiah*) and True (*Haqiqiyah*) Propositions and their Consequences

Ibrahim Noai

Muhaqqiq Nā'ini is a Shi'ah scholar in the field of the principles of jurisprudence. He has divided propositions into true (*haqiqiyah*) and external (*kharijiyah*) basing Islamic rulings on the former.

Having related this able scholar's definitions of afore-mentioned propositions and the answer he has given to the objection of circularity in the first figure of syllogisms on the basis of these definitions, the author tries to make some critical remarks on his point of view.

Keywords: *kharijiyah* proposition, *haqiqiyah* proposition, Muhaqqiq Nā'ini, Muhaqqiq Sabzewari, syllogism, circularity .